We develop a quantitative genetic model for conditional strategies that incorporates the ecological realism of previous strategic models. Similar to strategic models, the results show that environmental heterogeneity, cue reliability, and environment-dependent fitness trade-offs for the alternative tactics of the conditional strategy interact to determine when conditional strategies will be favored and that conditional strategies should be a common form of adaptive variation in nature. The results also show that conditional and unconditional development can be maintained in one of two ways: by frequency-dependent selection or by the maintenance of genetic variation that exceeds the threshold for induction. We then modified the model to take into account variance in exposures to the environmental cue as well as variance in response to the cue, which allows a derivation of a dose-response curve. Here the results showed that increasing the genetic variance for response both flattens and shifts the dose-response curve. Finally, we modify the model to derive the dose-response curve for a population polymorphic for a gene that blocks expression of the conditional strategy. We illustrate the utility of the model by application to predator-induced defense in an intertidal barnacle and compare the results with phenotypic models of selection.
polymorphism) or the environmental induction of alternative morphs (polyphenism or conditional strategy). While the ecological conditions for the existence of genetic polymorphism are rather restrictive, those for conditional strategies are less so (Maynard Smith and Hoekstra 1980; Lively 1986a Lively , 1999 Sultan and Spencer 2002) . Hence, conditional strategies are increasingly seen as common adaptations to both spatial and temporal environmental heterogeneity (West-Eberhard 2003) . The many examples now known include seasonal polyphenisms, the induction of defenses against predators, trophic polymorphisms, protective polymorphisms, and alternative male reproductive tactics and morphologies (for reviews, see Shapiro 1976; Harvell 1990; Travis 1994; Gotthard and Nylin 1995; Roff 1996; Greene 1999 ). In addition, conditional strategies are a focus of the emerging area of "eco-devo" (Gilbert 2001 ). However, the ecological genetics of conditional strategies remain poorly understood.
Building on the work of Levins (1968) , theoreticians developed strategic or phenotypic models to investigate the conditions necessary for the evolution and maintenance of conditional strategies (Maynard Smith 1982; Lloyd 1984; Lively 1986a Lively , 1999 Moran 1992; Gross 1996; Gross and Repka 1998; Hazel and Smock 2000; Sultan and Spencer 2002) . For example, Lively (1986a Lively ( , 1999 modeled an evolutionary game between two unconditional strategists and a conditional strategist. Conditional strategists were assumed to respond to an environmental cue associated with eventual attack by a predator by developing a phenotype resistant to such attack, while the unconditional strategists were assumed to produce canalized defended and undefended morphs. The models examined how the probability of attack (frequency of harsh patach), the association between the presence or absence of the cue and eventual attack (cue reliability), competitive interactions within patches, and fitness trade-offs for the two morphs (the cost of defense) could lead to the conditional strategy increasing when rare. Lively's (1986a) results showed that patch frequencies, cue reliability, and fitness trade-offs interact in determining when the conditional strategy is favored. For example, as the cue becomes more unreliable (decreasing values of G in fig. 1A , 1B), the range of patch frequencies over which 
ET predictions in the absence of competitive interactions ( ). D, ET predictions with competitive interactions (
). e p 1.0 e p 0.5 ij ij the conditional strategy is the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) decreases, with the conditional strategy no longer favored when the overall association between the presence and absence of the cue and the presence or absence of eventual predation is 50% or less ( fig. 1A) . Also, competitive interactions between morphs were necessary for the stable coexistence of conditional and unconditional strategists (cf. fig. 1A, 1B) . A second theoretical approach is the environmental threshold (ET) model, a quantitative genetic model that treats conditional strategies as environmentally cued threshold traits (Hazel et al. 1990; Hazel and Smock 1993; Roff 1996; Ostrowski et al. 2000) . The ET model postulates genetic variation underlying the response to the environmental cue, a common feature of conditional strategies (Hazel 1977; Hazel and West 1982; Hairston and Walton 1986; Knülle 1995 Knülle , 2003 Emlen 1996; Pulido et al. 1996; Roff 1996; Harvell 1998; Doums et al. 1998; Lively et al. 2000; Moczek et al. 2002) . However, the ET model has not examined the effects of cue reliability or competitive interactions on the evolution of conditional strategies, and neither the ET nor the strategic models have considered discrete variation in the strength of the environmental cue or the possibility of genes with a large effect on the response to such cues, both of which may be important features of conditional strategies, particularly the conditional strategy of predator-induced defense (Harvell 1998; Lively et al. 2000) .
In this article, we introduce the necessary changes in the ET model to make its assumptions consistent with those of strategic models, and we compare the two modeling approaches. We then extend the ET model to allow for multiple values of, or exposures to, the environmental cue influencing the conditional strategy and the effects of an epistatic allele that blocks expression of the conditional strategy. For ease of illustration, we present the model in the context of predator-induced defense and apply the model to predator-induced defense in an intertidal barnacle. However, the model is generally applicable to all conditional strategies.
The Environmental Threshold Model
Following Hazel et al. (1990) and Hazel and Smock (1993) , we assume that normally distributed heritable polygenic is scaled with exposure to the cue (t) on the upper axis. The threshold scale is infinite, while the exposures can take one of two values, t 0 , corresponding to no exposure to the cue, and t 1 , corresponding to exposure to the cue. Three distributions of thresholds, f(x), are shown. For each distribution, individuals with thresholds lying between t 0 and t 1 will be conditional strategists, while those with thresholds greater than t 1 will be canalized for morph U, and those with sensitivities less that t 0 will be canalized for morph D. Note that for the leftmost distribution, the population consists of a mixture of canalized and conditional strategists. variation in response threshold, x, to an inductive cue, t, underlies the alternative tactics of a conditional strategy. Each response threshold, x i , can be identified with a specific cue value, t i . If exposure to the cue is represented as t 1 and the lack of exposure is represented as t 0 , then only those individuals whose thresholds lie between t 1 and t 0 will be conditional strategists. With respect to predator-induced defense, individuals whose thresholds are greater than t 1 will always develop as the undefended morph, those whose thresholds are less than t 0 will always develop as defended, and those whose thresholds are between t 0 and t 1 will develop as defended if exposed to the inductive cue (i.e., conditional strategists; fig. 2 ). As the mean threshold, m, of a population increases from less than t 0 to greater than t 1 , the average individual in the population changes from canalized defended ( ) to conditional ( ) to
We use standard quantitative genetic theory to examine how different combinations of the ecological variables (patch frequency, fitness trade-offs, and cue reliability) influence the evolution of conditional strategy. Those combinations that result in a selection differential of 0 on the response threshold when the mean threshold lies between t 0 and t 1 define the ecological conditions favoring either the conditional strategy or, given sufficient variation in response threshold, some mixture of conditional and unconditional strategists ( fig. 2) .
With respect to predator-induced defense, selection on threshold acts through the fitnesses of the alternative tactics in each of the four combinations of cue and patch type in table 1, with selection in each combination contributing to the overall selection differential according to the frequency of that combination. The general formula for the selection differential, S, pooled across the four combinations is given by
(see appendix in the online edition of the American Naturalist for derivation) where
For the specific case of predator-induced defense, let of undefended morph in cue-patch combia p fitness 
probability that the cue is absent in the benign patch and G is the probability that the cue is present in the harsh patch. The benign and harsh patches occur with probabilities p and , respectively. 1 Ϫ p With competitive interactions between neighbors, the fitnesses are
where the integrals give the frequency of undefended and defended neighbors in each cue-patch combination, e ij is the fraction of fitness remaining for surviving morph i after interacting with morph j, and k is the fraction of fitness remaining for the defended morph such that 1 Ϫ reflects the cost of being defended. Further, Q is a nork malization factor obtained by taking a weighted average of the fitnesses, the weights being the probabilities that the different fitnesses are achieved. Note that the cue is absent in cue-patch combinations 1 and 4; therefore, t p t p . The cue is present in cue-patch combinations 2 and 3 t 0 so that . Substituting the above expressions t p t p t
for the a i , b i , q i , and t i into the selection differential and simplifying yields
where
The term U(m) quantifies the effect of selection in those environments where juveniles are not exposed to the cue, while the term E(m) quantifies the effect of selection in those environments where individuals are exposed to the cue. Solving the above for the mean threshold where S p for combinations of values for p, F, G, k, and e ij as defined 0 in table 1 gives the equilibrium mean, which can scale anywhere from negative to positive infinity and can be stable or unstable depending on whether selection is stabilizing, disruptive, or directional. Only in cases where the stable equilibrium mean is between t 0 and t 1 will the individual with the most common response threshold be a conditional strategist. The frequency of conditional strategists at equilibrium is then the fraction of individuals in the population with thresholds between t 0 and t 1 .
Comparing the ET and Strategic Models
For comparison with Lively's (1986a) strategic model, we define the winning strategy in the ET model as the strategy that over 95% of the population is playing at equilibrium. Figure 1 shows that the results of the strategic and ET models are very similar for all values of F, k, and e ij when the cue is reliable (i.e., when in fig. 1 1B and 1C, 1D) . This result is not surprising because if w u , w d , and w c are the expected fitnesses of individuals playing the undefended, defended, and conditional strategies, respectively, cues are reliable, and there are no competitive interactions, then the equilibrium mean response threshold is given by
1 1 (Hazel and Smock 1993) . How-
ever, when competitive interactions exist ( ), an ane ! 1 ij alytic solution for m is not possible.
In the ET model and the strategic model, as cue reliability increases, the conditional strategy is the winning strategy over a wider range of patch frequencies. In addition, in both models, the presence of competitive interactions increases the likelihood that mixtures of conditional and unconditional strategists will coexist (cf. fig. 1B,  1D ). There are, however, some differences in the results of the two models.
The strategic model produces a single area p-by-G pa- 
Note: G is the probability of being exposed to the inductive cue for individuals in the harsh patch. F is the probability of not being exposed to the inductive cue for individuals in the benign patch. p is the frequency of the benign patch. k is the reproductive success of defended individuals; therefore, is the cost of defense. e ij gives the effect of surviving 1 Ϫ k adult morph i on the fitness of its nearest adult neighbor j such that if , then competitive interactions have no e p 1 ij effect. D 1 is the probability of an adult defended individual occurring if the cue is present. D 2 is the probability of an adult defended individual occurring if the cue is absent. Undefended individuals are assumed to be unable to survive attack from the predator.
rameter space in which the conditional strategy is the ESS (when in fig. 1A , 1B). In contrast, the ET model G 1 0.5 results in two areas of parameter space where conditional strategists will exist at equilibrium (one for and G 1 0.5 another for in fig. 1C, 1D ). In general, when G ! 0.5 , the equilibria resulting in conditional (F ϩ G)/2 1 0.5 strategists are stable and are maintained by stabilizing selection. In contrast, the equilibria that result in a conditional strategy when (U or D in fig. 1C , (F ϩ G)/2 ! 0.5 1D) are unstable. In this area of parameter space, the cue is unreliable more than 50% of the time, and the net effect of selection on the response threshold is disruptive, which should result in the fixation of one or the other of the canalized strategies. Interestingly, when , (F ϩ G)/2 ! 0.5 the association between predation and cue (exposure to the predator as a juvenile) is reversed such that selection now will favor a conditional strategy where the defended morph is produced when the inductive cue is absent. Therefore, only when is the evolution of (F ϩ G)/2 p 0.5 some sort of conditional strategy precluded at all patch frequencies.
In the ET model, mixtures of conditional and unconditional strategists can exist at equilibrium even in the absence of competitive effects (data not shown), a result not possible in the strategic model. This is a consequence of the assumption that there is variance in response threshold. For example, if the standard deviation in threshold is large relative to the difference in t 1 and t 0 , then even when the mean threshold lies between t 1 and t 0 , the population will consist of conditional and canalized strategists. However, when the variance in response threshold is small relative to the difference in t 0 and t 1 , as in figure 1C, 1D , a stable mixture of conditional and unconditional strategists can exist only where there are competitive interactions ( fig. 1D) . Hence, when the variance in threshold is relatively small, the results of the strategic and ET models are very similar (cf. fig. 1A, 1B and 1C, 1D) .
The effect of competitive interactions is to add a frequency-dependent advantage to being defended regardless of whether produced by a canalized or conditional strategist. Such an advantage occurs because defended individuals in the harsh patch are released from competition because of the death of all undefended competitors. In the strategic model, such selection can result in a stable polymorphism that consists of both canalized strategies only for a limited range of patch frequencies ( fig. 1B) . Because the ET model assumes that variation in threshold is unimodal and normally distributed, the coexistence of only the two canalized strategies is a mathematical impossibility. However, a simple threshold model in which environmental cues are irrelevant should produce the same result as the strategic model (Roff 1998 where is fixed in the sense of Wright (1934a Wright ( , 1934b , * t the ET model becomes a simple threshold model, with the distribution of thresholds at equilibrium relative to de- * t termining the frequencies of the alternative morphs. With this modification, the equilibrium frequencies produced by both models are essentially identical (table 2), with the Note: To produce these data, k was fixed at 0.5, and all interactions, e ij , were fixed at 0.5.
small differences due to the approximation of integrals from to infinity used to estimate morph frequencies in * t the threshold model.
Multiple Values of the Cue
In the models described above, only two values of the cue, t 1 and t 0 , are possible. It is more realistic, however, to assume multiple values of the cue, with multiple exposures to the cue resulting in a larger fraction of the induced morph. For example, in predator-induced defense in the acorn barnacle Chthamalus anisopoma, increasing the number of exposures to the predatory snail Acanthina angelica increases the frequency of the defended morph (Lively et al. 2000) . Such dose-response relationships are a common feature of conditional strategies (Hazel et al. 1990 ).
To take into account multiple exposures to the cue, we assume that juveniles can be exposed i times to a cue that is variably associated with eventual predation, where i represents an integer greater than or equal to 0 up to some maximum number, n. Each value for the cue, t i , truncates the distribution of thresholds at a unique value, x i , such that individuals with thresholds less than x i develop as a defended morph. Individuals with thresholds less than t 0 are canalized defended, while those with thresholds greater than t n are canalized undefended. The selection differential, S, on response threshold is the sum of the effects of selection in each exposure environment and is given by
where f i is the probability of being exposed to the cue i times in the benign patch and w i is the probability of being exposed to the cue i times in the harsh patch; Q is a normalization factor obtained as described previously. The probability distributions for f i and w i are analogous to the variables F and G in the strategic model. As the degree of overlap of these distributions increases, the reliability of the cue decreases. The variables p, k, and e ij are as previously defined. Solving for m when gives the S p 0 mean of the equilibrium distribution of response thresholds, which can be depicted as a standard dose-response curve, with the number of exposures producing a 1 : 1 ratio of defended and undefended individuals equaling the equilibrium mean response threshold (see Hazel et al. 1990 ). As in the strategic model, as the cue becomes more unreliable (i.e., the overlap of exposure distributions, f i and w i , increases), the range of patch frequencies for which the average individual is a conditional strategist at equilibrium is decreased. Additionally, as cue reliability decreases, small changes in patch frequencies result in increasingly large changes in the dose-response curves ( fig.  3) .
Changes in variance in response threshold variance have the obvious effect of making the slope of the dose-response curve more shallow ( fig. 4 ), but the mean response threshold can also be affected by changes in variance, with the direction of change contingent on patch frequency (or fitness trade-off; fig. 4A, 4C ). In addition, as the variance in response threshold increases relative to the range of values of the exposure distribution, a greater fraction of the population will be effectively canalized (i.e., will have thresholds that lie outside of the limits of the exposure distribution). As a result, the dose-response curve will be truncated at these limits, and the population will contain mixtures of conditional and unconditional (i.e., canalized) strategists ( fig. 4) .
Major Gene Effects
Mixtures of conditional and apparently unconditional individuals are common in nature (see Lively 1999 for examples). The ET model accounts for such mixtures if, at equilibrium, the variance in thresholds results in some individuals with thresholds outside of the limits of the exposure scale and makes the production of one morph essentially obligate. Alternatively, Lively (1999) and Lively et al. (2000) have suggested that such mixtures might be due to the effects of an epistatic allele at a major gene that prevents expression of the conditional strategy. Under this situation, conditional and unconditional individuals can be maintained in the strategic model when competitive interactions lead to frequency-dependent selection.
Consider a population where the ecological conditions are such that the conditional strategy is favored. However, assume that this population is fixed for an allele at an epistatic locus whose effect is to mask expression of polygenic variation in response threshold. Under these conditions, a mutant allele at the epistatic locus that allows for expression of variation in response threshold will be favored. Such a mutant would increase in frequency because selection simultaneously shifts the distribution of response thresholds toward its equilibrium value (W. N. Hazel and R. Smock, unpublished manuscript) . In the absence of competitive interactions, the mutation will become fixed, and at equilibrium, all variation in response to the environmental cue will be due to differences in response threshold. However, if there is competition such that a mixture of conditional and unconditional strategists is expected at equilibrium, then the frequency of the mutant allele will increase only to some equilibrium value (W. N. Hazel and R. Smock, unpublished manuscript) . Thus, a fraction of the population will be unable to express variation in response threshold, and the dose-response curve for the population will saturate at less than 100% induced ( fig. 5 ).
Polymorphism at a major gene that masks variation in response threshold will affect selection on variation in response threshold because the canalized production of the undefended morph in the harsh patch as a result of epistasis increases the magnitude of the frequency-dependent selection on response threshold resulting from competitive interactions. If M is the fraction of the population that expresses the epistatic allele masking expression of variation in response threshold, then the selection differential on response threshold in the fraction of the pop-1 Ϫ M ulation expressing variation in response threshold is
.
The result is that the mean threshold response is such that the fraction, , of the population expressing variation 1 Ϫ M in response threshold is more likely to be induced than would have occurred in the absence of the epistasis, and the dose-response curve will saturate such that the maximum frequency of the induced morph is ( fig. 5 ). 1 Ϫ M
Discussion
It has recently been suggested that strategic and genetic models are complementary approaches to understanding adaptation in general and plasticity in particular (Moore and Boake 1994; Pigliucci and Schlichting 1999) . The results of this study illustrate this point and also provide theoretical justification for the assertion (West-Eberhard 2003) that conditional strategies should be a common source of discontinuous variation in nature.
To take into account the genetics of conditional strategies, we extended a quantitative genetic model (Hazel et al. 1990 ) that treats conditional strategies as environmentally cued threshold traits. Using the same ecological assumptions employed in a strategic model, we found that the two models make very similar predictions for when conditional strategies should evolve. Both indicate that environmental heterogeneity, fitness trade-offs for the alternative tactics in different environments, and cue reliability interact in essentially the same ways to select for conditional strategies. Overall, these results suggest that the lack of an explicit genetic basis for conditional strategies in the strategic model has little effect on its ability to define the ecological conditions that favor their evolution and maintenance.
In general, strategic models and quantitative genetic models that assume the same set of constraints should produce similar results (Charlesworth 1990; Hines and Turelli 1997; see also Taylor 1996; Gomulkiewicz 1998) . Therefore, one reason for the general agreement between the results of the two models is that built into both is the constraint that the alternative tactics of the conditional strategy result from the expression of the same genotype(s) in the different environments. In the strategic model, a single genotype is assumed to underlie the conditional strategy, while in the ET model, the same polygenic system is assumed to control the response threshold in different environments, resulting in a genetic correlation of 1 across environments. There is empirical support for the notion that the correlation in thresholds across environments is not significantly different from 1 for at least one environmentally cued threshold trait (Roff 1994) . If such a correlation is typical of conditional strategies, then the equilibrium response threshold will reflect a compromise between the opposing forces of selection operating in the different patches (Via and Lande 1985) . figure 3C were used to generate these curves, and k and e ij were each set at 0.5. When k and p are interchanged, the same results obtain. Note that the standard deviation in response threshold is scaled to number of exposures.
One of the most important conclusions drawn from strategic models is that the ecological conditions favoring the evolution of conditional strategies should be commonly met in nature. The ET model supports and strengthens this conclusion. Like the strategic model, the ET model shows that as the association of the inductive cue with patch type decreases from 100% to 50%, the range of patch frequencies over which the conditional strategy is favored decreases until the conditional strategy is not favored when the average association is 50% or less. However, when the average association between cue and patch type becomes less than 50%, an alternative conditional strategy can evolve such that association between morph type and inductive cue is reversed. This essentially doubles the parameter space over which some sort of conditional strategy is favored and strengthens the claim that conditional strategies should be a common adaptation to environmental heterogeneity, especially if there is migration Identical values of the ecological variables were used to generate the two curves. In the major gene version, 80% of the population is assumed to express an epistatic allele that blocks induction of the bent morph. Data points are from Lively et al. (2000) , and those data were used to estimate the variance in response thresholds used in the derivation of the curves predicted by the two versions of the model. between subpopulations in a metapopulation (Sultan and Spencer 2002) .
A major advance of the ET model results from the realistic assumption of normally distributed heritable variation in threshold (Barton and Turelli 1994) . As a result of this assumption, mixtures of conditional and canalized strategists can coexist in the same population, even in the absence of frequency-dependent selection (although competition more readily leads to such mixtures even when the variance in threshold is small). This assumption also makes it possible to predict the dose-response curve for a conditional strategy at equilibrium when there are multiple values of the environmental cue, making the model applicable to conditional strategies where multiple values of the cue are possible.
When multiple values of the cue are used, the ET model produced results that were conceptually similar to those of the simpler two-patch model, with decreasing cue reliability (increasing overlap of the exposure distributions in the multiple exposure model) decreasing the range of patch frequencies over which the conditional strategy is favored and increasing the amount of change in mean response threshold that results from a given change in patch frequencies (see fig. 3 ). As a result, when cues are somewhat unreliable, small, random changes in patch frequencies can result in strong fluctuating selection on response threshold, while directional changes in patch frequencies will result in rapid changes in mean threshold, even with moderate heritabilities. Such directional changes in patch frequencies could result in rapid morphological change over geological time, with populations moving rapidly from one canalized state through a conditional state to another canalized state. In other words, the evolution of plasticity could be rapidly followed by canalizing selection and genetic assimilation (Waddington 1953 ) when one patch type replaces another in a changing environment.
An important result of the ET model is that in addition to depending on the ecological variables such as cue reliability, patch frequencies, and fitness trade-offs, the equilibrium threshold also depends on threshold variance. Therefore, changes in the variance can have a relatively large effect and either increase or decrease the mean response threshold, depending on patch frequencies and fitness trade-offs (fig. 4) . The practical implication of this result is that investigations aimed at predicting the equilibrium response threshold for a conditional strategy need estimates of the variance in response threshold in addition to the relevant ecological variables.
The importance of the variance in response threshold in determining the equilibrium mean raises the question of how much variation in response threshold can be main-tained in natural populations. Empirical results suggest that many conditional strategies are underlaid by heritable variation (Hazel 1977; Hazel and West 1982; Hairston and Walton 1986; Knülle 1995; Emlen 1996; Pulido et al. 1996; Roff 1996; Doums et al. 1998) . At equilibrium, selection on response threshold of a conditional strategy will be stabilizing and should erode genetic variation in threshold. However, the effects of mutation (Lande 1978) , migration between environments (Barton 1999; Tufto 2000; Sultan and Spencer 2002) , and frequency-dependent selection (Roff 1998 ) can all theoretically maintain genetic variation. In addition, the amount of variation in response threshold at equilibrium will likely depend on the cue distributions. For example, if the cue distributions for the two patches are disjunct, stabilizing selection will be weaker than if the cue distributions are overlapping, especially if cues are reliable.
The models presented shed light on situations in which mixtures of conditional and canalized individuals occur in the same population (Lively 1999) . Such mixtures can occur because the variance in response threshold is large relative to the distribution of cues and/or because the population is polymorphic for an epistatic allele at a major locus that blocks the expression of variation in response threshold. Epistasis is indicated if the relationship between the strength of the cue and the frequency of the induced morph saturates at less than 100%. Consider, for example, the case of predator-induced defense in the intertidal barnacle Chthamalus anisopoma (Lively et al. 2000) , which produces a predation-resistant "bent" morph in response to exposure of juvenile barnacles to the predatory snail Acanthina angelica (Lively 1986b (Lively , 1986c . During the 25 d after cyprids had attached to experimental settlement plates, juvenile C. anisopoma were given increasing numbers of exposures to Acanthina (1 exposure/d), either on sequential days or on alternating days. Lively et al.'s (2000) results are shown in figure 5 along with dose-response curves derived from the ET model with and without epistasis. The saturation of the dose-response curve at slightly over 20% bent barnacles is most compatible with the presence of an epistatic allele. Lively et al.'s (2000) methodology strengthens this conclusion because the barnacles exposed to A. angelica 16, 19, 22 , and 25 times on sequential days were exposed during the same period of time as were the barnacles exposed eight to 13 times on alternating days, thus eliminating the possibility that the saturation of the dose-response curve reflects a decrease in responsiveness to the cue in older barnacles.
Finally, the ET model presented here is a fusion of Wright's (1934a Wright's ( , 1934b threshold model for digit gain and loss (see also Lande 1978) with the Baldwin effect (Baldwin 1896 (Baldwin , 1902 ) and Waddington's (1953) concept of genetic assimilation (Futuyma 1998 ). Wright developed the idea of a threshold trait as a way of explaining discontinuous traits whose inheritance did not follow Mendel's laws. Using digit number in guinea pigs, he hypothesized that individuals with trait values on one side of a fixed physiological threshold developed three digits, while those on the other side developed four. Baldwin and Waddington both suggested that individuals could differ genetically in the ease with which on/off developmental switches respond to an environmental stimulus. Waddington, however, viewed the production of such phenotypic alternatives as a transitory stage as a population shifts from one canalized phenotype to another (i.e., the response to the environmental stimulus becomes genetically assimilated). In the ET model, the position of Wright's physiological threshold relative to trait values (individual response thresholds) is determined by an environmental cue, and a conditional strategy evolves when the ecological conditions are such that Waddington's process of genetic assimilation is arrested by selection before the response to the environmental cue becomes canalized.
